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Abstract—In our previous work (‘An Algebraic Watchdog for
Wireless Network Coding’), we proposed a new scheme in which
nodes can detect malicious behaviors probabilistically, police their
downstream neighbors locally using overheard messages; thus,
provide a secure global self-checking network. As the first building
block of such a system, we focused on a two-hop network,
and presented a graphical model to understand the inference
process by which nodes police their downstream neighbors and
to compute the probabilities of misdetection and false detection.
In this paper, we extend the Algebraic Watchdog to a more
general network setting, and propose a protocol in which we
can establish trust in coded systems in a distributed manner.
We develop a graphical model to detect the presence of an
adversarial node downstream within a general two-hop network.
The structure of the graphical model (a trellis) lends itself
to well-known algorithms, such as Viterbi algorithm, that can
compute the probabilities of misdetection and false detection.
Using this as a building block, we generalize our scheme to
multi-hop networks. We show analytically that as long as the
min-cut is not dominated by the Byzantine adversaries, upstream
nodes can monitor downstream neighbors and allow reliable
communication with certain probability. Finally, we present
preliminary simulation results that support our analysis.
I. INTRODUCTION
We consider the problem of Byzantine detection in a coded
wireless network. Previous work on Byzantine detection fo-
cused on receiver-based protocols, in which the destination
nodes of the corrupted data detects the presence of an adver-
sary upstream. However, this detection may come too late as
the adversary is partially successful in disrupting the network
(even if it is detected). It has wasted network bandwidth, while
the source is still unaware of the need for retransmission.
In our previous work [1], we proposed a new scheme
called the algebraic watchdog, in which nodes can detect
malicious behaviors probabilistically by taking advantage of
the broadcast nature of the wireless medium. The algebraic
watchdog was inspired by the an analogous protocol for
routing wireless networks, called the watchdog and pathrater
[2]. The key difference between the our previous work [1] and
that of [2] is that we allow network coding. Network coding
[3][4] is advantageous as it increases throughput, is robust
against failures/erasures, and is resilient in dynamic networks.
The key challenge in algebraic watchdog is that, by incor-
porating network coding, we can no longer recognize packets
individually. In [2], a node v can monitor its downstream
neighbor v′ by checking that the packet transmitted by v′ is
a copy of what v transmitted to v′. However, with network
coding, this is no longer possible as transmitted packets are a
function of the received packets. Furthermore, v may not have
full information regarding the packets received at v′; thus,
node v is faced with the challenge of inferring the packets
received at v′ and ensuring that v′ is transmitting a valid
function of the received packets. We note that [5] combines
source coding with watchdog; thus, [5] does not face the same
problem as that of algebraic watchdog.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
We use elements from a field, and their bit-representation.
We use the same character in italic font (i.e. x) for the field
element, in bold font (i.e. x) for the bit-representation, and
in underscore bold font (i.e. x) for vectors. For arithmetic
operations in the field, we shall use the conventional notation
(i.e. +,−, ·). For bit-wise addition, we use ⊕.
The problem statement for this paper is similar to that
in our previous work [1]. A wireless network is modeled
using a directed graph G = (V,E1, E2), where V is the
set of network nodes, E1 the set of intended transmissions,
and E2 the set of interference channels. If (vi, vj) ∈ E1
and (vi, vk) ∈ E2 where vi, vj , vk ∈ V , then there is an
intended transmission from vi to vj , and vk can overhear
this transmission with noise (modeled using binary symmetric
channel BSC(pik)). Node vi ∈ V transmits a coded packet
pi, where pi = [ai,hIi ,hxi ,xi] is a {0, 1}-vector. A valid
packet pi is defined as below:
• ai corresponds to the coding coefficients αj , j ∈ Ii,
where Ii ⊆ V is the set of nodes adjacent to vi in E1,
• hIi corresponds to the hash h(xj), vj ∈ Ii where h(·) is
a δ-bit polynomial hash function,
• hxi corresponds to the polynomial hash h(xi),
• xi is the n-bit representation of xi =
∑
j∈I αjxj .
The payload xi is coded with a (n, ki)-code Ci with
minimum distance di. Code Ci is an error-correcting code of
rate Ri = kin = 1−
di
n
, and is tailored for the forward commu-
nication. For instance, v1 uses code C1, chosen appropriately
for the channel (v1, vj) ∈ E1, to transmit the payload x1.
We assume that the payload xi is n-bits, and the hash h(·) is
δ-bits. We assume that the hash function used, h(·), is known
to all nodes, including the adversary. In addition, we assume
that ai, hIi and hxi are part of the header information, and are
sufficiently coded to allow the nodes to correctly receive them
even under noisy channel conditions. Note that the hashes
hIi and hxi are contained within one hop, and the overhead
associated with the hashes is proportional to the in-degree of
a node, and does not accumulate with the routing path length.
v1
v2
vm-1
vm
p1
p2
pm-1
pm
vm+1 vm+2
pm+1
edges in E2
edges in E1
Fig. 1: A small neighborhood of a wireless network with v1.
Assume that vi transmits pi = [ai,hIi ,hxi , xˆi], where xˆi =
xi⊕e, e ∈ {0, 1}n. If vi is misbehaving, then e 6= 0. Our goal
is to probabilistically detect when e 6= 0. Note that even if |e|
is small (i.e. small Hamming distance between xˆi and xi), the
algebraic interpretation of xˆi and xi may differ significantly.
A. Threat Model
We assume powerful adversaries, who can eavesdrop its
neighbor’s transmissions, has the power to inject or corrupt
packets, and are computationally unbounded. However, the
adversary does not know the specific realization of the random
errors introduced by the channels. The adversaries’ objective
is to corrupt the information flow without being detected by
other nodes. Thus, the adversary will find xˆi that will allow
its misbehavior to be undetected, if there is any such xˆi.
Our goal is to detect probabilistically a malicious behavior
that is beyond the channel noise, represented by BSC(pik).
Note that the algebraic watchdog does not completely elim-
inate errors introduced by the adversaries; its objective is to
limit the errors introduced by the adversaries to be at most
that of the channel. Channel errors (or those introduced by
adversaries below the channel noise level) can be corrected
using appropriate error correction schemes, which will be
necessary even without Byzantine adversaries in the network.
The notion that adversarial errors should sometimes be
treated as channel noise has been introduced previously in
[6]. Under heavy attack, attacks should be treated with special
attention; while under light attack, the attacks can be treated
as noise and corrected using error-correction schemes. The
results in this paper partially reiterate this idea.
III. ALGEBRAIC WATCHDOG FOR TWO-HOP NETWORK
Consider a small neighborhood of nodes in G with nodes
v1, v2, ...vm, vm+1, vm+2. Nodes vi, i ∈ [1,m], want to
transmit xi to vm+2 via vm+1. Without complete information
about all the messages, we cannot verify whether vm+1
is misbehaving or not with certainty. However, there is a
large overhead associated with acquiring complete informa-
tion. Therefore, we take advantage of the wireless setting,
in which nodes can overhear their neighbors’ transmission
(as shown in Figure 1), to probabilistically detect malicious
behavior. Each node checks whether its downstream neighbors
are transmitting values that are consistent with the gathered
information. If a node detects that its downstream neighbor is
misbehaving, it can alert other nodes within the network.
The graphical model illustrates the inference process a
node executes to check its next hop node. Without loss of
generality, we consider the problem from v1’s perspective.
Denote x˜i to be the noisy message v1 overhears from node vi’s
transmission, for any i ∈ [2,m]. Since the header is protected,
v1 correctly decodes h(xi) and αi for all i ∈ [1,m].
A. Transition matrix
We define a transition matrix Ti to be a 2n(1−H(
di
n
))+δ ×
2n(1−H(
di
n
)) matrix, where H(·) is the entropy function.
Ti(x˜i, y) =
{
pi(x˜i,y)
N , if h(y) = h(xi)
0, otherwise
,
pi(x˜i, y) = p
∆(x˜i,y)
i1 (1 − pi1)
n−∆(x˜i,y),
N =
∑
{y|h(y)=h(xi)}
pi(x˜i, y),
where ∆(x,y) gives the Hamming distance between code-
words x and y. In other words, v1 computes X˜i = {x|h(x) =
h(xi)} to be the list of candidates of xi. For any overheard
pair [x˜i,h(xi)], there are multiple candidates of xi (i.e. |X˜i|)
although the probabilities associated with each inferred xi are
different. This is because there are uncertainties associated
with the wireless medium, represented by BSC(pi1).
For each x ∈ X˜i, pi(x˜i, x) gives the probability of x being
the original codeword sent by node vi given that v1 overheard
x˜i under BSC(pi1). Since we are only considering x ∈ X˜i,
we normalize the probabilities using N to get the transition
probability Ti(x˜i, x). Note Ti(x˜i, y) = 0 if h(y) 6= h(xi).
The structure of Ti heavily depends on the collisions of
the hash function h(·) in use. Note that the structure of Ti
is independent of i, and therefore, a single transition matrix
T can be precomputed for all i ∈ [1,m] given the hash
function h(·). A graphical representation of T is shown in
Figure 2a. For simplicity of notation, we represent T as a
matrix; however, the transition probabilities can be computed
efficiently using hash collision lists as well.
B. Watchdog trellis
Node v1 uses the information gathered to generate a trellis,
which is used to infer the valid linear combination that
vm+1 should transmit to vm+2. As shown in Figure 2b, the
trellis has m layers: each layer may contain up to 2n states,
each representing the inferred linear combination so far. For
example, Layer i consist of all possible values of
∑i
j=1 αjxj .
The matrices Ti, i ∈ [2,m], defines the connectivity of the
trellis. Let s1 and s2 be states in Layer i − 1 and Layer i,
respectively. Then, an edge (s1, s2) exists if and only if
∃ x such that s1 + αix = s2, Ti(x˜i, x) 6= 0.
We denote we(·, ·) to be the edge weight, where we(s1, s2) =
Ti(x˜i, x) if edge (s1, s2) exists, and zero otherwise.
C. Viterbi-like algorithm
We denote w(s, i) to be the weight of state s in Layer i.
Node v1 selects a start state in Layer 1 corresponding to α1x1,
as shown in Figure 2. The weight of Layer 1 state is w(s, 1) =
1 if s = α1x1, zero otherwise. For the subsequent layers,
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Fig. 2: Graphical representation of the inference process at node v1. In the trellis, the transition probability from Layer i− 1
to Layer i is given by Ti(x˜i, xi), which is shown in (a).
multiple paths can lead to a given state, and the algorithm
keeps the aggregate probability of reaching that state. To be
more precise, w(s, i) is:
w(s, i) =
∑
∀s′∈Layer i−1
w(s′, i− 1) · we(s
′, s).
By definition, w(s, i) is equal to the total probability of
s =
∑i
j=1 αjxj given the overheard information. Therefore,
w(s,m) gives the probability that s is the valid linear com-
bination that vm+1 should transmit to vm+2. It is important
note that w(s,m) is dependent on the channel statistics,
as well as the overheard information. For some states s,
w(s,m) = 0, which indicates that state s can not be a valid
linear combination; only those states s with w(s,m) > 0 are
the inferred candidate linear combinations.
Note that the algorithm introduced above is a dynamic
program, and is similar to the Viterbi algorithm. Therefore,
tools developed for dynamic programming/Viterbi algorithm
can be used to compute the probabilities efficiently.
D. Decision making
Node v1 computes the probability that the overheard x˜m+1
and h(xm+1) are consistent with the inferred w(·,m) to make
a decision regarding vm+1’s behavior. To do so, v1 constructs
an inverse transition matrix T−1, which is a 2n(1−
dm+1
n
) ×
2n(1−
dm+1
n
)+δ matrix whose elements are defined as follows:
T−1(y, x˜m+1) =
{
pm+1(x˜m+1,y)
M , if h(y) = h(xm+1)
0, otherwise
,
M =
∑
{y|h(y)=h(xm+1)}
pm+1(x˜m+1, y).
Unlike T introduced in Section III-A, T−1(x, x˜m+1) gives
the probability of overhearing [x˜m+1, h(xm+1)] given that
x ∈ {y|h(y) = h(xm+1)} is the original codeword sent by
vm+1 and the channel statistics. Note that T−1 is identical
to T except for the normalizing factor M. A graphical
representation of T−1 is shown in Figure 2c.
In Figure 2c, s1 and s3 are the inferred candidate linear
combinations, i.e. w(s1,m) 6= 0 and w(s2,m) 6= 0; the
end node indicates what node v1 has overheard from vm+1.
Note that although s1 is one of the inferred linear combina-
tions, s1 is not connected to the end node. This is because
h(s1) 6= h(xm+1). On the other hand, h(s2) = h(xm+1); as a
result, s2 is connected to the end node although w(s2,m) = 0.
We define an inferred linear combination s as matched if
w(s,m) > 0 and h(s) = h(xm+1).
Node v1 uses T−1 to compute the total probability p∗ of
hearing [x˜m+1, h(xm+1)] given the inferred linear combina-
tions by computing the following equation:
p∗ =
∑
∀s
w(s,m) · T−1(s, x˜m+1).
Probability p∗ is the probability of overhearing x˜m+1 given
the channel statistics; thus, measures the likelihood that vm+1
is consistent with the information gathered by v1. Node v1 can
use p∗ to make a decision on vm+1’s behavior. For example,
v1 can use a threshold decision rule to decide whether vm+1 is
misbehaving or not: v1 claims that vm+1 is malicious if p∗ ≤ t
where t is a threshold value determined by the given channel
statistics; otherwise, v1 claims vm+1 is well-behaving.
Depending on the decision policy used, we can use the
hypothesis testing framework to analyze the probability of
false positive and false negative. Reference [1] provides such
analysis for the simple two-hop network. However, the purpose
of this paper is not to propose a decision policy, but to propose
a method in which we can compute p∗, which can be used to
establish trust within a network. We note that it would be
worthwhile to look into specific decision policies and their
performance (i.e. false positive/negative probabilities) as in [1].
IV. ANALYSIS FOR TWO-HOP NETWORK
In this section, we provide an analysis for the performance
of Algebraic Watchdog for two-hop network.
Theorem 4.1: Consider a two-hop network as shown in
Figure 1. Consider node vj , j ∈ [1,m]. Then, the number
of matched codewords is:
2
n
[∑
i6=j,i∈[1,m+1]
(
H(pij)−H(
di
n
)
)
−1
]
−mδ
.
Proof: Without loss of generality, we consider node
v1. The proof uses on concepts and techniques developed
for list-decoding [7]. We first consider the overhearing of
vk’s transmission, k ∈ [2,m]. Node v1 overhears x˜k from
vk. The noise introduced by the overhearing channel is
characterized by BSC(pk1); thus, E[∆(xk, x˜k)] = npk1.
Now, we consider the number of codewords that are within
B(x˜k, npk1), the Hamming ball of radius npk1 centered at x˜k
is |B(x˜k, npk1)| = 2n(H(pk1)−H(
dk
n
))
. Note that v1 overhears
the hash h(xk); thus, the number of codewords that v1 consid-
ers is reduced to 2n(H(pk1)−H(
dk
n
))−δ
. Using this information,
v1 computes the set of inferred linear combinations, i.e. s
where w(s,m) > 0. Note that v1 knows precisely the values
of x1. Therefore, the number of inferred linear combinations
is upper bounded by:∏
k∈[2,m]
(
2
n
(
H(pk1)−H(
dk
n
)
)
−δ
)
(1)
= 2
n
[∑
k∈[2,m]
(
H(pk1)−H(
dk
n
)
)]
−(m−1)δ (2)
Note that due to the finite field operations, these inferred linear
combinations are randomly distributed over the space {0, 1}n.
Now, we consider the overheard information, x˜m+1 from
the downstream node vm+1. By similar analysis as above,
we can derive that there are 2n(H(pm+1,1)−H(
dm+1
n
))−δ code-
words in the hamming ball B(x˜m+1, npm+1,1) with hash
value h(xm+1). Thus, the probability that a randomly chosen
codeword in the space of {0, 1}n is in B(x˜m+1, npm+1,1) ∩
{x|h(x) = h(xm+1)} is:
2n(H(pm+1,1)−H(
dm+1
n
))−δ
2n
. (3)
Then, the expected number of matched codewords is the
product of Equations (2) and (3).
Note that if we assume that the hash is of length δ = εn,
then the statement in Theorem 4.1 is equal to:
2
n
[∑
i6=j,i∈[1,m+1] H(pij)−
(∑
i6=j,i∈[1,m+1] H(
di
n
)+1+mε
)]
. (4)
This highlights the tradeoff between the quality of overhearing
channel and the redundancy (introduced by Ci’s and the hash
h). If enough redundancy is introduced, then Ci and h together
form an error-correcting code for the overhearing channels;
thus, allows exact decoding to a single matched codeword.
The analysis also shows how adversarial errors can be inter-
preted. Assume that vm+1 wants to inject errors at rate padv.
Then, node v1, although has an overhearing BSC(pm+1,1),
effectively experiences an error rate of padv + pm+1,1 −
padv · pm+1,1. Note that this does not change the set of
the inferred linear combinations; but it affects x˜m+1. Thus,
overall, adversarial errors affect the set of matched codewords
and the distribution of p∗. As we shall see in Section VI, the
difference in distribution of p∗ between a well-behaving relay
and adversarial relay can be used to detect malicious behavior.
V. PROTOCOL FOR ALGEBRAIC WATCHDOG
In this section, we use the two-hop algebraic watchdog
from Section III in a hop-by-hop manner to ensure a globally
secure network. In Algorithm 1, we present a distributed
algorithm for nodes to secure the their local neighborhood.
Each node v transmits/receives data as scheduled; however,
node v randomly chooses to check its neighborhood, at which
point node v listens to neighbors transmissions to perform the
two-hop algebraic watchdog from Section III.
Corollary 5.1: Consider vm+1 as shown in Figure 1. As-
sume that the downstream node vm+2 is well-behaving, and
thus, forces hxm+1 = h(xm+1). Let pi be the packet received
by vm+1 from parent node vi ∈ P (v). Then, if there exists at
least one well-behaving parent vj ∈ P (v), vm+1 cannot inject
errors beyond the overhearing channel noise (pm+1,j) without
being detected.
Section IV shows that presence of adversarial error (at a
rate above the channel noise) can be detected by a change in
distribution of p∗. Note that this Corollary 5.1 does not make
any assumptions on whether packets pi’s are valid or not.
Instead, the claim states that vm+1 transmits a valid packet
given the packets pi it has received.
Corollary 5.2: Node v can inject errors beyond the channel
noise only if either of the two conditions are satisfied:
1) All its parent nodes P (v) = {u|(u, v) ∈ E1} are
colluding Byzantine nodes;
2) All its downstream nodes, i.e. receivers of the transmis-
sion pi, are colluding Byzantine nodes.
Remark: Note that, in Case 1) of Corollary 5.2, v is not
responsible to any well-behaving nodes. Node v can transmit
any packet without the risk of being detected by any well-
behaving parent node. However, the min-cut to v is dominated
by adversaries, and the information flow through v is com-
pletely compromised – regardless of whether v is malicious or
not. In Case 2) of the Corollary 5.2, v can generate any hash
value since its downstream nodes are colluding adversaries.
Thus, it is not liable to transmit a consistent hash, which
is necessary for v’s parent nodes to monitor v’s behavior.
However, note that v is not responsible in delivering any data
to a well-behaving node. Even if v were well-behaving, it
cannot reach any well-behaving node without going through
a malicious node in the next hop. Thus, the information flow
through v is again completely compromised.
Therefore, Corollary 5.2 shows that algebraic watchdog can
aid in ensuring correct delivery of data when the following
assumption holds: for every intermediate node v in the path
between source to destination, v has at least one well-behaving
parent and at least one well-behaving child – i.e. there exists
at least a path of well-behaving nodes. This is not a trivial
result as we are not only considering a single-path network,
but also multi-hop, multi-path network.
foreach node v do
According to the schedule, transmit and receive data;
if v decides to check its neighborhood then
Listen to neighbors’ transmissions;
foreach downstream neighbor v′ do
Perform Two-hop Algebraic Watchdog on v′;
end
end
end
Algorithm 1: Distributed algebraic watchdog at v.
TABLE I: The average and variance of p∗ with varying padv.
We set m = 3, n = 10, δ = 2, and ps = pm+1,1 = 10%.
padv p
∗
adv
varadv p
∗
relay
varrelay
0% 0.0262 0.0019 0.0262 0.0019
5% 0.0205 0.0019 0.0259 0.0022
10% 0.0096 2.8933 × 10−4 0.0220 0.0012
15% 0.0129 7.7838 × 10−4 0.0302 0.0023
20% 0.0139 7.7535 × 10−4 0.0287 0.0018
30% 0.0093 5.6885 × 10−4 0.0243 0.0012
TABLE II: The average and variance of p∗ with varying δ. We
set m = 3, n = 10, ps = pm+1,1 = 10%, and padv = 10%.
δ p∗
adv
varadv p
∗
relay
varrelay
0 0.0046 3.8552× 10−4 0.0071 4.4103× 10−4
1 0.0083 3.1523× 10−4 0.0120 4.6351× 10−4
2 0.0096 2.8933× 10−4 0.0220 0.0012
3 0.0067 2.3491× 10−4 0.0240 0.0015
VI. SIMULATIONS
We present preliminary MATLAB simulation results that
show the difference in distribution of p∗ between the well-
behaving and adversarial relay. We consider a setup in Figure
1. We set all pi1, i ∈ [2,m] to be equal, and we denote
this probability as ps = pi1 for all i. We denote padv to
be the probability at which the adversary injects error; thus,
the effective error that v1 observes from an adversarial relay
is combined effect of pm+1,1 and padv. The hash function
h(x) = ax + b mod 2δ is randomly chosen over a, b ∈ Fδ2.
We set n = 10; thus, the coding field size is 210. For each
data point, we run the algebraic watchdog 200 times.
For simplicity, we assume that the nodes do not use an error-
correcting code Ci; thus, di = 0 for all i. Note that this limits
the power of the algebraic watchdog; thus, the results shown
can be further improved by using error correcting codes Ci.
We denote p∗adv and p∗relay as the value of p∗ when the relay
is adversarial and is well-behaving, respectively. We denote
varadv and varrelay to be the variance of p∗adv and p∗relay .
Our simulation results coincide with our analysis and intu-
ition. Section IV noted that v1 can detect adversarial errors
padv ≥ pm+1,1. As shown in Table I, node v1 is able to
monitor its downstream node vm+1 when padv ≥ pm+1,1.
There is a significant change in the distribution of p∗ once
padv ≥ pm+1,1 = 10%. Table II shows that increase in
redundancy (by using hash functions of length δ) helps v1
detect malicious behaviors. Note that for this simulation, δ > 1
gives enough redundancy for v1 monitor vm+1.
Table III shows that overhearing channel between v1 and
vi, i ∈ [2,m] is important in detection. This agrees with our
intuition – if node v1 is able to infer better the messages
xi, the better its detection abilities. Thus, as the overhearing
channel progressively worsens (ps increase), v1’s ability to
detect malicious behavior deteriorates, as shown in Table III.
In Table IV, we note the effect of m. Node v1’s ability to
check vm+1 is reduced with m. When m increases, the number
of messages to infer increases, which increases the uncertainty
in the system. However, Table IV does not take into account
that with increase in m, there are more vi’s, i ∈ [1,m] that
TABLE III: The average and variance of p∗ with varying ps.
We set m = 3, n = 10, δ = 2, and padv = 10%.
ps p
∗
adv
varadv p
∗
relay
varrelay
5% 0.0067 6.3986 × 10−4 0.0455 0.0051
10% 0.0096 2.8933 × 10−4 0.0220 0.0012
20% 0.0033 4.9045 × 10−5 0.0055 7.3819× 10−5
30% 0.0069 1.6414 × 10−4 0.0100 8.5259× 10−4
TABLE IV: The average and variance of p∗ with varying m.
We set n = 10, δ = 2, ps = pm+1,1 = 10%, and padv = 10%.
m p∗
adv
varadv p
∗
relay
varrelay
1 0.0155 0.0025 0.1386 0.0238
2 0.0087 1.2932× 10−4 0.0225 0.0011
3 0.0096 2.8933× 10−4 0.0220 0.0012
4 0.0082 1.1902× 10−4 0.0136 3.4301 × 10−4
5 0.0063 4.1841× 10−5 0.0079 5.2244 × 10−5
perform checks on vm+1 independently.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have proposed a multi-hop, multi-source
algebraic watchdog, which allows network coded wireless
systems to validate its information flows. A node monitors
its downstream node by overhearing transmissions of its
neighboring nodes; and uses the overheard information to infer
what the behavior of its downstream node should be. Using
the algebraic watchdog scheme, nodes can compute a proba-
bility of misbehavior, which can be used to detect malicious
behavior. Once a node has been identified as malicious, these
nodes can either be punished/eliminated or excluded from the
network by using reputation based schemes [2][8].
We have provided a trellis-like graphical model for the
detection inference process, and provided an algorithm that
may be used to compute the probability that a downstream
node is consistent with the overheard information. We have
analytically shown how the size of hash function, minimum
distance of the code used, as well as the overhearing channel
quality can affect the probability of detection. Finally, we have
presented preliminary simulation results that coincide with our
analysis and intuition.
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